1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This guide specifies unified basic requirements for the planning, design, construction, modification and operation of the physical protection system for nuclear facilities, in order to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities and the legitimate use of nuclear materials.
1.2 Scope
This guide is applicable to the design, construction, renovation, extension and operation of onshore stationary nuclear facilities for civil use. This guide may be referenced for nuclear power plants, offshore floating reactors and other nuclear facilities.
2 Basic principles
2.1 Design basis threat
The design basis threat of nuclear facilities can be used as the design and evaluation basis of the physical protection system upon it is submitted to and confirmed by the national competent authority.
2.2 Protection by grades and areas
The protection by grades (Grade I, Grade II and Grade III) and areas (vital area, protected area and control access area) shall be applied to the nuclear facilities based on importance and potential risk level of the protection target.
2.3 Integrity, reliability and effectiveness of system
For the physical protection system, coordinated elements of detection, delay and response shall be guaranteed and functions of physical protection equipment shall be improved to achieve the organic combination of artificial defense and technology defense measures and minimize the impact of component failure.
2.4 Defense in depth and balanced protection
The physical protection system shall be provided with multiple physical barriers based on the physical protection grades of the facilities, and be equipped with multiple levels and different technology types of detection and alarm systems. The parts of the same security area shall have basically the same safety protection level, without obvious weak links or hidden dangers.
2.5 Simultaneous design, construction and operation
The physical protection system shall be subjected to simultaneous design, construction and operation as the main works of the nuclear facilities.
2.6 Compatibility with other systems
For the nuclear facilities, during the planning of the plant area layout, scientific demonstration shall be carried out on the layout of the physical protection system.
The physical protection system shall be compatible with safety operation, emergency, fire-fighting, radiation protection and other systems of the nuclear facilities.
2.7 Cyber security
The operating unit of the nuclear facilities shall take corresponding measures to ensure the cyber security of physical protection system.
3 Organization and its responsibilities
3.1 Organization
(1) The operating unit of the nuclear facilities shall establish a full-time physical protection organization, define authorities and responsibilities of the organization and allocate full-time security management personnel who can satisfy the requirements of the physical protection.
(2) The legal representative of the operating unit of the nuclear facilities shall be fully responsible for the physical protection, and may designate a responsible person to take charge of specific work of physical protection.
3.2 Responsibilities
The operating unit of the nuclear facilities shall be responsible for physical protection of their facilities Its key responsibilities are as follows:
(1) developing, revising and organizing the implementation of rules and regulations on physical protection according to the characteristics of nuclear facilities during different periods of construction and operation. They mainly include: security work outline, physical protection quality assurance, confidentiality, security and guarding, physical protection area access management and contingency plan, etc.
(2) patrol inspection in the physical protection area, access management and control of personnel, vehicles and goods, and surveillance and warning. In the event of an emergency, the operating unit shall carry out defense, alarming, tackling, and cooperates with relevant departments to find and recover the missing nuclear materials, etc. to minimize the harm and impact caused by the event.
(3) management, training and examination of security personnel.
(4) use, operation, maintenance and repair of the technology defense system for physical protection.
(5) determining its security objective and sentry setting, guiding and coordinating the duty work of the guard forces.
(6) developing and reporting the operation, upgrading and renovation schemes of its physical protection system.
(7) carrying out effectiveness evaluation of its physical protection system. The evaluation shall cover: implementation of rules and regulations for physical protection, operation and maintenance of physical protection system, integrity and reliability of physical protection system, etc.
4 Grades and areas
4.1 Grades of physical protection for nuclear facilities
For the nuclear facilities, three grades of physical protection are established according to (1) extent of harm to the public and the environment caused by radioactive release that may occur after the nuclear facilities are destroyed, (2) type, quality, enrichment degree, radiation level, and physical and chemical forms of nuclear materials in the nuclear facilities, and (3) geographic location and type of the nuclear facilities, and other factors. When the grade of physical protection for the nuclear facilities is higher than that of the nuclear materials, the physical protection shall be carried out according to the grade of physical protection for the nuclear facilities.
4.1.1 Nuclear facilities with Grade I physical protection
(1) Nuclear facilities whose nuclear materials have a physical protection of up to Grade I;
(2) Reactors with a core thermal power of more than 100MW (th);
(3) Spent fuel pools containing a portion of newly unloaded fuel, with a total amount of greater than 1017Bq Cs-137 (equivalent to the core inventory of 3000MW(th) reactor);
(4) Facilities that independently store and treat an inventory of radioactive substances in high-level liquid waste that is equal to or greater than 10000 times of the danger number D2 (see Annex A for D2 value of common radionuclides);
(5) Independent spent fuel element reprocessing facilities;
(6) Other nuclear facilities not mentioned above, but with dangers equivalent to the above conditions.
4.1.2 Nuclear facilities with Grade II physical protection
(1) Nuclear facilities whose nuclear materials have a physical protection of up to Grade II;
(2) Reactors with the core thermal power of more than 2MW(th) and less than 100MW(th);
(3) Spent fuel storage facilities containing newly unloaded spent fuel for which active cooling is required;
(4) Facilities that independently store and treat an inventory of radioactive substances in the dispersible high-level radioactive solid waste and intermediate level liquid waste that is equal to or greater than 100 times of the danger number D2, and facilities that independently store and treat an inventory of radioactive substances in high-level liquid waste that is less than 10000 times of the danger number D2;
(5) Facilities that have a distance of not exceeding 0.5km from the boundary of the plant area and may suffer from an uncontrolled criticality accident;
(6) Other nuclear facilities not mentioned above, but with dangers equivalent to the above conditions.
4.1.3 Nuclear facilities with Grade III physical protection
(1) Nuclear facilities whose nuclear materials have a physical protection of up to Grade III;
(2) Reactors with the core thermal power of less than 2MW(th);
(3) Facilities that independently store and treat an inventory of radioactive substances in the dispersible intermediate level radioactive solid waste and low level liquid waste that is equal to or greater than 0.1 times of the danger number D2, and facilities that independently store and treat an inventory of radioactive substances in the dispersible high-level radioactive solid waste and intermediate level liquid waste that is less than 100 times of the danger number D2;
(4) Facilities that have a direct external radiation dose rate of more than 100mGy/h at 1m if the shielding is lost;
(5) Facilities that have a distance of exceeding 0.5km from the boundary of the plant area and may suffer from an uncontrolled criticality accident;
(6) Other nuclear facilities not mentioned above, but with dangers equivalent to the above conditions.
4.2 Protection of nuclear facilities by areas
4.2.1 Division of security areas
The physical protection area of nuclear facilities is subjected to the protection and management by areas, and is divided into control access area, protected area and vital area. Control access area, protected area and vital area shall be established for the nuclear facilities with Grade I physical protection. Control access area and protected area shall be established for the nuclear facilities with Grade II physical protection. Control access area shall be established for the nuclear facilities with Grade III physical protection. The three areas shall be laid out in depth, with the vital area set in the protected area and the protected area in the control access area.
4.2.2 Protection by areas
(1) Nuclear materials, devices, equipment, ancillary facilities (e.g., main control room, nuclear reactor and its auxiliary plant, nuclear fuel warehouse, safety class generator room, safety class coolant circulating pump, high-level liquid waste treatment equipment, main process plant of spent fuel element reprocessing, etc.) and security control center involved in 4.1.1 of this guide shall be placed in the vital area. Other nuclear materials, devices, equipment and ancillary facilities to be protected shall be placed in the protected area or control access area depending on their degree of importance.
(2) Nuclear materials, devices, equipment, ancillary facilities (e.g., main control room, nuclear reactor and its auxiliary plant, nuclear fuel warehouse, emergency generator room, safety class coolant circulating pump, low enriched uranium concentrator, intermediate level liquid waste and high-level radioactive solid waste treatment equipment, etc.) and security control center involved in 4.1.2 of this guide shall be placed in the protected area. Other nuclear materials, devices, equipment and ancillary facilities to be protected shall be placed in the control access area.
(3) Nuclear materials, devices, equipment, ancillary facilities (e.g., main control room, nuclear reactor and its auxiliary plant, nuclear fuel warehouse, low-level liquid waste and intermediate and low level radioactive solid waste treatment equipment, etc.) and security duty room involved in 4.1.3 of this guide shall be placed in the control access area.
(4) Card production room of nuclear facilities with all physical protection grades shall be placed in the control access area. Main switch station, network control building, non-radioactive maintenance workshops of electrical and mechanical equipment and instruments, office buildings, large warehouses and storage depots (except for nuclear facilities), etc. shall not be placed in the protected area or the vital area.
5 Physical protection of fixed place
5.1 Security and guarding
Corresponding security forces shall be allocated according to the grades of the physical protection for the nuclear facilities. The security forces usually include the armed police, security guards, etc. They must pass regular review, training and examination, and be provided with necessary devices and communications. The security station shall be as close to the nuclear facilities as possible to facilitate rapid response and handling of emergencies. The operating unit of the nuclear facilities shall grant the security forces with clear authorities and put them under its centralized management. Main responsibilities of the security forces are as follows:
(1) carrying out duty, alerting and day/night patrol tasks at entrances, exits, vital parts and perimeters of the physical protection area.
(2) strictly controlling the personnel access, and doing a good job of examination and registration.
(3) carrying out check and inspection nearby the area where the alarm occurs.
(4) performing emergency tasks in the event of an emergency. The tasks mainly include: reporting to the superior and relevant authority in a timely manner, quickly blocking, tracking and hunting down intruders, performing public evacuation and rescue where necessary, etc.
5.2 Physical barrier
The physical barriers in the physical protection area shall surround and enclose the whole protected area. The barriers in different areas shall be independent, complete and reliable to avoid overlapping. The physical barrier includes fence type and wall type. The control access area and the vital area shall be provided with single-layer barriers, which may be of either fence type or wall type. The protected area shall be provided with double-layer barrier, which is of fence type. The distance between the barriers in each area should not be less than 6 m, and anything that facilitates climbing shall not be provided on both sides of the perimeter barrier in each area. The fence-type physical barrier should have a distance of not less than 6m from the protection target or building.
5.2.1 General requirements
(1) The fence-type barrier is made of high-strength and corrosion-resistant steel wire. The diameter of steel wire shall not be less than 3mm, the length of each side of the grid shall not be greater than 6cm, or the mesh area shall not be greater than 12.9cm2. The spacing between fence posts should be 2m to 3m. The foundation of the post must be buried underground. For clay ground, the depth of the foundation should not be less than 0.9m and the foundation should be poured with concrete. For other geological types of ground (e.g., frozen soil layer or bedrock layer), the depth of the post foundation may be increased or decreased as appropriate. The post and its foundation shall meet the requirements of strength, deformation and stability. The specific design shall be subject to the requirements of the current standards GB 50007 Code for design of building foundation, GB 50010 Code for design of concrete structures and GB 50017 Code for design of steel structures. The distance between the bottom of the fence and the ground shall not be greater than 5cm.
(2) The wall-type barrier is made of brick, stone, concrete, steel or a combination thereof. In the design and construction, places which are favorable for intruders to hide shall be avoided.
(3) For barriers with vertical height of not less than 2.5m, two-way (V-shaped) or one-way cantilever bracket shall be installed on the top. The bracket arm inclines upwards to form an included angle of 30° to 45° with the vertical direction. The single-arm bracket extends to the outer side of the perimeter with a length of not less than 0.7m, and multiple strands of barbed iron wires with parallel intervals of not more than 15cm shall be attached to the bracket. The double-arm bracket extends to the inner and outer sides of the perimeter. The top shall be provided with a barbed spiral roll net. The spiral diameter shall not be less than 0.7m and the spiral spacing should not be greater than 0.6m.
(4) The barrier shall be built on hard or compacted ground. In case of loose sand and gravel, soil migration, easy accumulation of water on the surface, etc., the ground shall be solidified or concrete base shall be laid first.
(5) If the holes on the barrier have an area of greater than 620cm2 with the minimum spacing of more than 15cm, the holes shall be blocked by steel bar grilles with both vertical and horizontal spacing of less than 15 cm. The steel bar shall be firmly fixed around the opening, with a diameter of not less than 1.6cm.
(6) If there are accessible canals, culverts or pipe trenches under the barrier (with the passage diameter of greater than 50cm), they shall be blocked by steel bar grilles, etc. when water flow is allowed to pass through. In sunken ground without water flow, the ground shall be filled and tamped, or blocked with steel rail, brick or fence, etc. The above measures must provide the same capability of delay as the barrier body.
(7) At the junction of the pipeline and the barrier, protective measures such as reinforcement, capping, bolt locking, grid mesh, etc. shall be taken to avoid the decrease in the overall delay of the barrier due to such junction.
(8) A fence gate shall be provided at the junction of the railway and the barrier. The fence gate shall have the same capability of delay as the adjacent barrier. When no train passes, the railway switch shall not face the direction of the physical protection area.
(9) Personnel patrol passage with a width of not less than 2m or vehicle patrol passage with a width of not less than 4m shall be arranged inside the barriers of the control access area and the protected area and outside the barriers of the vital area. When conditions are restricted, the width of the patrol passage can be reduced, provided that it allows a single person or vehicle to pass.
5.2.2 Additional requirements
5.2.2.1 Control access area
The effective height of the vertical part of the barrier shall not be less than 2.5m. If wall-type barrier is used, the wall thickness shall not be less than 200 mm.
5.2.2.2 Protected area
The effective height of the vertical part on the outer layer of the double-layer barrier shall not be less than 1.5m, and that of the vertical part on the inner layer shall not be less than 2.5m.
An isolation zone shall be formed between the double-layer fence-type barriers, and its width should not be less than 6m. The isolation zone shall be flat in topography to avoid water accumulation, and be kept clear of sundries, trees or weeds.
5.2.2.3 Vital area
(1) The buildings in the protected area themselves can form the barrier of the vital area, and can also be connected with the adjacent fence or wall to form the barrier of the vital area.
(2) The buildings that by themselves form a barrier for the vital area must be solid on six sides. The delay capability of the wall, floor and roof shall not be less than that of 20cm thick reinforced concrete layer.
(3) The window on the walls of buildings that form barriers in the vital area shall be protected with steel bar grilles. Spacing between steel bars shall not be greater than 15cm, the diameter of the steel bar shall not be less than 1.6cm, and the steel bar must be firmly embedded on both sides of the window frame. If stainless steel pipe fence is used, it shall have equivalent strength.
5.3 Access control
5.3.1 Personnel entrance/exit
(1) The number of personnel entrances and exits in the physical protection area shall be kept to the necessary minimum. Their delay capability shall be matched with that of the adjacent physical barriers.
(2) The number of personnel authorized to enter the physical protection area shall be reduced to the necessary minimum. Personnel entering or exiting the physical protection area shall be subjected to permit inspection and safety inspection at the entrance and exit. Permits with different identifications or authorities shall be used for different physical protection areas. All permits must have functions of anti-forgery, anti-duplication and anti-alteration. Unless otherwise provided, all personnel shall wear or carry the permits after entering the physical protection area.
(3) The examination and approval authority shall be strictly stipulated for the application from the visitor to enter the physical protection area. After obtaining the entry authorization, the visitor shall go through the registration formalities. Temporary visitors entering and exiting the protected area and the vital area shall be accompanied by the personnel designated by the unit.
(4) The entrances and exits shall be equipped with video monitoring and communication devices to keep in touch with the security control center at any time.
(5) The entrance and exit channels shall normally be locked. The channels can only be opened after the identity of the personnel is confirmed by the access control system. Only one permit holder is allowed to enter and exit each time when the channel is opened. The access control for the protected area and the vital area shall have functions of anti-back transmission, anti-intimidation and anti-trailing, while that for the control access area shall have the function of anti-back transmission.
(6) Contraband inspection measures shall be provided at the entrances and exits of the protected area or/and the vital area to inspect the entering and exiting personnel and the articles they carry.
(7) Number of personnel entering the vital area shall be strictly limited. The entrance and exit of the nuclear material storage warehouse shall be managed according to the principle of "two persons and two locks". Once there is someone in the warehouse, the two-person rule shall be implemented to realize the detection of unauthorized actions through continuous monitoring.
5.3.2 Vehicle entrance and exit
(1) Vehicle entrances and exits in each security area shall be arranged separately, and their quantity shall be kept to the necessary minimum. Their delay capability shall be matched with that of the adjacent physical barriers. The examination and approval authority and accompanying system shall be strictly stipulated for the vehicles that indeed need to enter the physical protection area.
(2) Vehicle permits with different identifications shall be used for different security areas, and only one vehicle is allowed to enter and exit each time the door is opened. The vehicle is not allowed to carry any other persons to enter or exit.
(3) The vehicle entrance and exit of the control access area shall be arranged with the vehicle decelerating device.
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Scope
2 Basic principles
2.1 Design basis threat
2.2 Protection by grades and areas
2.3 Integrity, reliability and effectiveness of system
2.4 Defense in depth and balanced protection
2.5 Simultaneous design, construction and operation
2.6 Compatibility with other systems
2.7 Cyber security
3 Organization and its responsibilities
3.1 Organization
3.2 Responsibilities
4 Grades and areas
4.1 Grades of physical protection for nuclear facilities
4.2 Protection of nuclear facilities by areas
5 Physical protection of fixed place
5.1 Security and guarding
5.2 Physical barrier
5.3 Access control
5.4 Technology defense measures
5.5 Security control center, security duty room and emergency command center
5.6 Emergency handling
5.7 Cyber security
6 Physical barrier and technology defense measures in nuclear facilities construction
6.1 Physical barrier and technology defense measures in phased construction of nuclear facilities
6.2 Physical barrier and technology defense measures of adjacent nuclear facilities built at the same site
7 Evaluation on physical protection system
7.1 Basic requirements
7.2 Evaluation method
7.3 Effectiveness evaluation in design phase
7.4 Effectiveness evaluation in operation phase
8 Quality assurance
Terms and definitions
Annex A Danger number D2 (TBq) of common radionuclides
